What are the determining factors of banks loans collateralization? Our paper answers this question by using the unique internal data of eight Italian banks at 2008 reporting 9,930 bank-firm relationships. We have three main results. First, we provide evidence that observed riskier borrowers are encouraged to give more collateral to banks in order to obtain a loan, while in presence of hidden information are the less risk borrowers to offer collateral in order to signal their quality. Second, we show relationship banking has a direct impact on the use of collateral as well as produces moderating effects on the other determining factors. Finally, unlike lender-based theories we observe distant banks, i.e., banks with more difficulties to collect and transfer soft information, are more likely to pledge collateral than local banks.
Introduction
Collateralization is a widespread feature of the credit acquisition process as documented by several studies (recently, Berger et al. 2011b; Menkhoff et al., 2012) and indicated by descriptive statistics on banking systems in industrialized countries.
The collateralization practice has been investigated across various countries (e.g. Udell, 1990, 1995; Berger et al., 2011a; Harhoff and Korting, 1998; Jiménez et al., 2009; Ono and Uesugi, 2009 use non-U.S. data) and type of lending (e.g. Chakraborty and Hu, 2006; Jiménez et al., 2009 focus on business lending: Hainz, Dinh, and Kleimeier, 2011; Menkhoff, et al., 2012 analyze both business lending and consumer lending).
Previous research has also analyzed the determining factors of collateral. Various papers (e.g. Besanko and Thakor, 1987a; Ono and Uesugi, 2009; Berger et al., 2011a, b) point out that the probability of pledging collateral is strictly related to observed characteristics of the borrower (i.e., age, size and risk). Other studies link the presence or not of collateral to more or less relationship banking (e.g. Berger and Udell, 1995; Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000; Chakraborty and Hu, 2006) , level of credit market competition (Besanko and Thakor, 1987a; Jiménez et al., 2009) , and lenders characteristics (Inderst and Mueller, 2007; Jiménez et al., 2009 ).
The empirical evidence on reasons of collateralization paints a mixed picture, and the predictions on the relationship between the probability of pledging collateral and the explanatory variables vary across theories. Following the borrower-based theories (Chan and Kanatas, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987a; Boot et al., 1991) some loans are collateralized and others not because of informational advantages of borrowers over lenders; in similar situations, banks ask for collateral in order to solve the problems of adverse selection, caused by ex-ante information gap (hidden information), and/or of moral hazard arising from ex-post information gap (hidden actions).
Following the lender-based theories (Inderst and Mueller, 2007; Jiménez et al., 2009 ) the use of collateral serves to exploit the information advantage of local lenders, relative to distant ones, in evaluating the borrowers risk, when the competition constrains banks choice about the interest rates loans.
As such, although numerous papers have investigated the collateralization, why some loans are secured and others not has remained partly unresolved.
What are the determining factors of banks loans collateralization? Are there significant differences between secured loans granted to rated and unrated borrowers? Do banks ask for collateral to offset the problems caused by information asymmetry or to exploit their information advantage? Our paper answers these questions by using the unique internal data of eight Italian banks reporting 9,930 bank-firm relationships.
The Italian data are especially useful for three reasons, at least. First, Italian firms are very sensitive to any distortion in credit supply because they are highly dependent on bank credit.
Second, the high taxation associated with the weakness of legal systems encourages firms to manipulate accounting data for tax saving goals (Fabbri and Padula, 2004; Bianco et al., 2005) and makes the Italian credit market an ideal setting to test the impact of asymmetric information problems on the use of collateral. Third, the great concentration of banks headquarters in a single area (the north), allows us to observe the existence of difference in the behavior between local lenders and distant ones (Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Alessandrini et al., 2009 ).
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. According to moral hazard and adverse selection hypotheses, we find that riskier borrowers give more collateral to banks, but in presence of hidden information are the less risk borrowers to offer collateral in order to signal their quality.
However, not only collateral is able to solve the asymmetric information problems as we find the stronger the relationship banking the lower is the probability that banks asking for collateral.
Furthermore, in sharp contrast with the lender-based theory, we observe distant banks are more likely to pledge collateral than local banks, although we find the duration of relationship banking acts on the lender-borrower distance by reducing the probability that distant banks ask for collateral.
Finally, we find that a possible effect of high competition in credit markets is represented by a greater demand for collateral. Overall our results confirms the borrowed-based theories: namely on one hand we suggest that collateral mainly serves to reduce the informational advantages of borrowers over lenders, especially in high competitive credit markets, the other we display that relationship lending is complementary to collateral.
We believe to enrich the existing literature on collateral in different ways. The major contribution of our paper is the use of a unique and distinctive dataset that allows us to exactly measure the borrower risk observed by bank lender (i.e., internal ratings) and to distinguish between borrowers with observed risk measure and borrowers whose level of risk is not observable from bank lender (i.e., borrowers without internal rating). This is particularly important because, unlike previous studies, that mainly use proxies for the borrowers observed risk and fail to check if bank lender is affected or not by hidden information problems, we are able to better stress the adverse selection and moral hazard hypotheses.
The second contribution is that we find a strong complementarity between relationship banking and the use of collateral. This result is novel to the extent we observe that a strong relationship banking (i.e., old relationship) negatively affects the use of collateral both because it directly reduces the probability of pledging collateral and because it produces moderating effects on those factors that increase the probability of asking collateral (such as the lender-borrower distance).
The third contribution is that unlike the lender-based theories we observe distant banks are more likely to pledge collateral than local banks. This result appears consistent with the idea that distant lenders, i.e., the lenders for which it is more difficult to collect and transfer soft information, ceteris paribus are more affected by asymmetric information problems than local lenders, and therefore are more inclined to ask for collateral.
The remainder of the paper is organized into the following sections. Section 2 presents the literature on collateralization and discusses research hypotheses. Sections 3 and 4 describe the data and empirical strategy, respectively. Section 5 explains variables we use in the empirical analysis and Section 6 discusses our main findings. Section 7 concludes.
Literature review and research hypotheses
The use of collateral in the credit acquisition process is widespread, such as suggested by numerous studies on bank lending process (e.g. Ono and Uesugi, 2009; Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009; Berger et al., 2011a , b, Broccardo et al., 2012 . Thus, collateralization appears as a robust phenomenon that extends across countries and time periods, even if, it has been shown that the request for collateral is higher in less developed markets (see e.g. Menkhoff et al., 2012) as a consequence of both opaque information and weak enforcement of contracts. Several studies have also observed that the use of collateral in debt contracts arises several problems, for borrowers, lenders and credit markets. Borrowers incur opportunity costs because of more restrictive asset usage, fluctuations in their credit availability due to value changes of their collateralized assets, and increase in costs of default (e.g. Berger et al., 2011) . Lenders have to sustain costs of screening and maintenance of the pledged assets, as well as any legal and other administrative expenses in the case of repossession (Igawa and Kanatas, 1990) . Coherently, collateral can also have a negative impact on the credit market efficiency, as banks that are highly protected by collateral may perform too little screening of the projects that they finance (Manove et al., 2001) . Finally it's worth to note that when collateral requirement is too high, firms could be discouraged to apply a bank loan (Chakravarty and Xiang, 2013) .
Since the collateral arises several drawbacks, from the early 1980s, various studies have been done in order to understand why some loans are collateralized and others not. The debate is furthered by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) , who point out that banks are able to screen the wealth of risk-adverse borrowers by using differently collateralized loan contracts. Following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) pioneering paper, several hypotheses have been developed in attempt to explain the determining factors of collateralization. The first set of theoretical models (the borrower-based theories) explains collateral as arising from information gaps between borrowers and lenders that can lead to an equilibrium characterized by adverse selection, moral hazard and credit rationing problems (e.g. Besanko and Thakor, 1987a; Boot et al., 1991) . The second set of theoretical models (the lender-based theories) argues that collateral serves to the local lenders to exploit their informational advantages over the distant lenders, in contexts where competition constrains the banks' choice about the loan interest rates (e.g. Inderst and Muller, 2007) .
The best known argument for the use of collateral is the presence of informational advantages of borrowers over lenders (e.g., Besanko and Thakor, 1987a; Boot et al., 1991) . As a result, the borrower-based theories recognise that the use of collateral varies across loans according to the characteristics of borrowers, which in turn affect information asymmetries between both parties with regard to actions taken by the borrower after the loan is extended (moral hazard hypothesis) or about the credit risk of the loan (adverse selection hypothesis).
According to the moral hazard hypothesis, various papers (e.g., Bester 1994; Boot et al., 1991; Jiménez et al., 2009) highlight that collateral potentially helps to mitigate moral hazard problems in contexts where banks are able to distinguish the credit quality across borrowers, but suffer information asymmetries with regard to borrower behaviour after the loan is granted. Thus, contrary to models based on hidden information, those focused on hidden actions predict a positive relationship between the borrower observed-risk and the probability to pledge collateral, because collateral induces more effort by the borrower (Boot et al., 1991) or reduces its incentives of strategic default (Bester, 1994) . Consistently, a positive relationship between the existence of collateral and the cost of debt should be expected. In their study, John et al. (2003) suggest that lower quality firms are required to use collateral when issuing debt while higher quality firms issue debt without it. Furthermore, they found (after controlling for credit rating) that the yield differential between secured and unsecured debt is larger for low credit rating and consider perk consumption (or neglect) of the collateralized assets as one of the determinants of this difference.
Following these studies we define the moral hazard hypothesis as follows:
H 1 : the likelihood of the use of collateral in bank loans increases with the borrower observedrisk According to the adverse selection hypothesis, various papers (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Bester, 1987; Boot et al., 1991; Berger et al., 2011b) point out that collateral acts as a signal allowing the bank to offset the adverse selection and credit rationing problems caused by the exante information gap. The idea is that in presence of hidden information, banks are not able to exactly evaluate the borrowers risk and thus collateral enables lower-risk borrowers to signal their quality in attempt to pay lower risk premiums and/or increase their credit availability. Consequently, the adverse selection theory predicts that riskier borrowers are less likely to pledge collateral. Since the main determining factor of collateralization is related to unobserved risk, from an empirical point of view, recent studies (Jiménez et al., 2006; Berger et al., 2011a) have attempted to analyse the adverse selection hypothesis by using ex post measures of borrower riskiness (i.e., defaults after the loan origination) or by using proxies for private information that lenders did not have when the loan was granted (Berger et al., 2011b) . Following previous studies we define the adverse selection hypothesis as follows: Since various studies have explained the use of collateral as an attempt to mitigate both ex-ante and ex-post information disadvantages, a large literature has grown up by testing whether the level of borrower's transparency plays a role in reducing the likelihood to pledge collateral. Thus, several papers (Jiménez et al., 2009; Ono and Uesugi, 2009; Berger et al., 2011a) (Boot and Thakor 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000; Chakraborty and Hu, 2006; Brick and Palia, 2007) have pointed out that also the relationship banking should play an important role in mitigating asymmetric information problems between borrowers and lenders improving the borrower's corporate governance (Dass and Massa, 2011) .
The benefits of relationship banking practices is also confirmed during crises time since bankdepositor relationships help mitigate the credit rationing effects explained by a supply-side point of view (Puri et al., 2011) .
Banks that have strong relationship with their borrowers are able to capture some of the hidden information concerning the borrowers risk and their ex-post actions, thus reducing the ask for collateral. However, from the empirical standpoint, it is unclear whether the strength of the relationship banking affects the likelihood of collateral being pledged (e.g. Berger and Udell, 1995; Machauer and Weber, 1998; Menkhoff et al., 2006; Brick and Palia, 2007; Ono and Uesugi, 2009 ).
The mixed results probably depends both by the type of variable used to proxy the strength of relationship banking (mainly duration and number of banks the borrower has loans with) and because it is theoretically likely that a solid relationship becomes detrimental to the borrower if it causes hold-up problems (i.e., Rajan, 1992; Sharpe, 1990; Boot, 2000; Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000) . Based on previous studies we define our fourth hypothesis as follows: The distance is another dimension to measure the strength of the relationship and is considered as a proxy for a lender's informational advantage for nearby competitors, because borrower proximity facilitates the collection of soft information (Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010; Dass and Massa, 2011 ).
An emerging literature (Inderst and Mueller, 2007; Jiménez et al., 2009) suggests the use of collateral is strictly related to borrower observed characteristics and more or less relationship banking, as well as it varies across the characteristics of lenders (i.e. lender-borrower distance) and of credit market (i.e. level of concentration). As such, these studies describe the use of collateral as the way to exploit the information advantage of local lenders over distant ones in estimating a loan credit risk when competition limits the interest rates that local banks can charge on the loans (lender-based theory). In other words, the opportunity that borrowers have to select between local and distant lenders gives them a reservation profit because the distant lenders are less informed about local credit market conditions and offer loans at favorable conditions for borrowers. In a similar environment, the choice of the loan interest rate by local banks is constrained and they ask for collateral in order to still take advantage of any superior information. Therefore, the lenderbased theory predicts that the use of collateral will be higher for loans granted by local lenders.
However, unlike this prediction and according to the borrower-based theories, it is also theoretically possible that are the distant lenders, i.e., the lenders for which it is more difficult to collect and transfer soft information, to ask more collateral, because ceteris paribus they are more affected by asymmetric information problems. Thus, the formal representation of the fifth hypothesis of this study is as follows:
likelihood of the use of collateral in bank loans increases (decreases) for distant lenders (local lenders).
Competition represents another main factor capable to explain lending processes in banking industry. Bank competition may affect positively the elasticity of demand for loans, and may alter the role of information in loan approval process affecting the task of loan officers and the use of soft or hard information. Heider and Inderest (2012) , argue that in response to more competition, banks reduce lending standards and may choose to prefer the use hard information disregarding soft information in their credit approval. Furthermore, a relationship between market power and collateral requirements also have been explored by the literature on market power in banking studies.
Over the 1990s the deregulation process is based on the idea that stimulating competition and increasing contestability in banking sector was the way to improve quality of credit and sustainable growth (Besanko and Thakor, 1987a) and to reduce the financing obstacles (Beck et al., 2006) . As a consequence, an increase of bank competition should be associated to a reduction of both loan rates and collateral requirements. However, in sharp contrast with this prediction some papers (e.g. Jiménez et al., 2006, and Jiménez et al., 2009 ) have found that high competitive credit markets are linked to more use of collateral. The likely explanation of this evidence is that in high competitive credit markets bank lenders use collateral to collect rents from borrowers that have higher reservation profits. Conversely, in more concentrated markets, reservation profits are expected to be lower, and therefore less use of collateral is expected. Hence, the sixth formal hypothesis to address in this study is as follows:
likelihood of the use of collateral decreases (increases) with credit market concentration

Data
We collected credit-file data from eight Italian banks that belong to a large bank group operating across Italy. The banking group is one of a few truly national banks operating in Italy; it lends to borrowers located in 106 out of 110 provinces and operates in 165 industries (six-digit NACE classification).
Our data consist of 9,930 observations containing bank-borrower data 1 (included information on collateral and the bank internal borrower ratings), local banking market concentration and firmspecific variables. We select our sample by using the following criteria. First, we consider firms that are active at the end of 2008 and for which we know if they are still active or not after two years (i.e., 2010). This criteria allow us to collect information on unobserved risk. Second, we consider only firms for which we have notice about the address of the local branch where the borrower established and still holds the relationship. This criteria allow us to construct a measure of bank's organizational distance (i.e., Jiménez et al., 2009 ) and test the impact of the latter on the probability of pledging collateral. Third, we drop data related to individual customers, as we are interesting in studying the bank-firm relationship. As such, our sample is composed by data of loans granted to 9,930 firms by 31 December 2008. Since one goal of this study is to test both the adverse selection hypothesis and the moral hazard hypothesis, we separate our sample in two samples based on rating availability. The first sample consists of 8,205 firms that had an internal rating calculated by lender at the time of the analysis. The second sample consists of 1,725 firms without rating (hidden information) due to lack of borrower's transparency. 
Empirical Strategy
Following previous studies (e.g., Jiménez et al. 2009; Berger et al., 2011b) , we run a cross sectional probit model to explore the determinants of collateral.
Thus, the probability of a loan being secured is given by:
where Φ is the standard normal distribution function, x is a vector of explanatory variables, including measures of variables for a firm's creditworthiness, the strength of the bank-firm relationship, market structure and other firm's characteristics, including industry dummies.
As such, we use two different model specifications to test the determinants of collateral for rated firms (Sample A) and unrated firms (Sample B). 
where where the subscript i indicates the borrowing firm (i=1..9,930), subscript j indicates the lender (j=1..8), while Collateral ij is a binary variable that takes the value of one if the borrower i has any kind of collateral with the lender j, and 0 otherwise;all other variable are defined in Table 1 . Furthermore, to test the H 2 , while controlling for H 3 , H 4 , H 5 , and H 6 we use a second empirical model to explain the use of collateral for unrated firms (Sample B) by replacing Risk with the other following variables: Default (i.e., the borrower's unobserved risk measure) and Share (i.e., the percentage of firms served by each bank over the total number of firms active in the province of firm at the end of the year) and their cross-effects with new loans (i.e., Default*New and Share*New).
Additionally, we run a cross sectional probit model to explore the mitigating effect of relationship on the use of collateral. More specifically, we formulate the following empirical model to test the impact of the relationship measures on the probability of pledging collateral: 
where YEARS*LENDERS(1/0) is the cross effect between the duration of relationship and a dummy related to the number of lenders.
Moreover, to disentangle the contribution of relationship variables to determine collateral pledging, we separately add to Eq. (3) other two dummies to measure the moderating effects between the duration of bank-firm relationship with, respectively, market competition and the quality of lenders intended as distant or local bank.
In all specifications, the standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. Since we using a firm level variable as dependent, while some key explanatory variables are at the bank and market level, the assumption of independently distributed errors could be not appropriate. Hence, initially we clustering the standard errors at the bank level to correct the variance-covariance matrix. The results are similar to the no-clustering OLS results. However we decided do not use clustering data at bank-level due to the low number of banks of the sample (eight) 2 .
Variables
This section describes the variables we use in our analysis. Specifically, we describe our dependent variable (Section 5.1), i.e., the collateral, and the independent variables used into two previous models, i.e., borrower's characteristics in terms of observed-risk, unobserved-risk and transparency variables (Section 5.2), the relationship banking indicators (Section 5.3), the lender's characters and the credit market indicators (Section 5.4), and the control variables (Section 5.5).
Collateral
Following previous papers (e.g., Chakraborty and Hu, 2006; Ono and Uesugi, 2009; Berger et al., 2011a) and in order to identify the motivations for the use of collateral, we measure our dependent variable (COLLATERAL ij ) as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if loan granted from bank j to borrower i is collateralized and 0 otherwise 3 . Since we have no information neither on the percentage of collateralized loans and on the type of loan, we cannot extend the analysis of Jimenez et al. (2004) and drawing conclusions about the quality of collateralized loans or the impact of innovative assets used as collateral on the incentive of lenders to finance firms (Giannetti, 2012) .
Further, our data do not consent to identify the date of loan's collateralization since we use cross sectional data at one point in time (31 December 2008). Consequently, we know whether a loan have or not a collateral, but not when the borrower to pledge it. However, as we will describe below, this lack of information is solved indirectly with the introduction of a dummy variable (NEW ij ) that help us to isolate a subsample of loans for which we know the date of loan's collateralization.
Borrower's characteristics variables
Various studies have pointed out that asking for collateral is strictly related to the characteristics of the borrower in terms of risk, both observed and unobserved, and transparency (Jiménez et al., 2009; Ono and Uesugi, 2009; Berger et al., 2011b) . Therefore in this sub-section we explain how we measure these variables.
Observed-risk measure
The borrower's observed-risk has been traditional measured by using accounting information (Chakraborty and Hu, 2006; Ono and Uesugi, 2009; Berger et al., 2011a) or by analyzing whether the loan is given to a borrower that defaulted with any bank in the previous year (e.g., Jiménez et al., 2009 ). However, both these indicators may fail to capture the level of risk effectively observed by bank lenders, because the latter before granting a loan have to analyze quantitative and qualitative data, and information on whether the borrower defaulted with any bank in the previous years (more than one). Therefore, in order to overrun this drawback, we use the variable RATING ij that represents a snapshot of the credit risk observed by bank lender j. Indeed, this variable contains the borrower's creditworthiness as calculated by the banks' internal borrower rating system, which is composed of 10 risk classes for solvent borrowers (i.e., 1 = the less risky class; 10 = the worst) 4 .
Consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis the better the risky class, the lower is the probability of pledging collateral. While the exact calculation of internal rating is a black box, we know that rating are calculated according a mixed approach that considering as main determinants the balance-sheet of firms and the existence (and severity) of past default and current events in the credit history of the borrower both with the single lender and with the bank system. Thus, we can exclude endogeneity problems with the dependent variable, COLLATERAL, that plays a significant role in the loan approval process only at the stage of Loss Given of Default (LGD) calculation.
Unobserved-risk measure
Previous studies have attempted to measure the borrower's unobserved-risk by using ex-post information on credit quality (Jiménez et al., 2006 (Jiménez et al., , 2009 Berger et al., 2011a) , namely whether or not the borrower ends up in default after the loan has been granted, or by using proxies for private information that lenders did not have when the loan was granted (Berger et al., 2011b) . Following the approach of Jiménez et al. (2009) , we measure unobserved risk through a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm receives a distress rating notch from bank because the former experiences a default event after two years (DEFAULT ij ) from the time of our cross section analysis 5 . However, unlike previous study we use the DEFAULT ij only for borrowers who belong to the "unrated class", and for which we are sure there are hidden information problems. According to adverse selection hypothesis the probability of pledging collateral decreases with the borrowers' default.
Borrower's transparency indicator
Various studies observe that the level of borrower's transparency plays a role in reducing the likelihood to pledge collateral. Thus, following several papers (Jiménez et al., 2009; Ono and Uesugi, 2009; Berger et al., 2011a) we identify the firm's size as the main borrower's transparency variable affecting the use of collateral: larger firms should be less opaque than others, because potential lenders unable to collect more information on their investment opportunities or managerial skills. However, while previous studies (e.g. Ono and Uesugi, 2009 ) measure the firm's size as the book value of total sales, we use four dummy variables, one for each category of firms (micro, small, medium-sized and large) provided by banks. This four-size classification considers both sales and other variables, such as asset size and number of workers. According to the borrowers-based theory the likelihood of the use of collateral decreases moving from the micro-firms up to large firms.
Relationship banking variables
A large part of the existing literature on collateral (Boot and Thakor 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000; Chakraborty and Hu, 2006; Brick and Palia, 2007) has pointed out that the relationship banking plays an important role in mitigating asymmetric information problems between borrowers and lenders, and in turn affects the use of collateral. As suggested by these studies we measure the strength of the relationship banking through the following two variables.
The first relationship variable is LENDERS i that reports the number of banks the borrower i has loans with. According to previous research (e.g., Chakraborty and Hu, 2006 ) the higher the number of borrower's lenders the higher is the probability that its loans will be secured, as the lack of exclusivity may reduce the quality of soft information deriving from the lending relationship.
The second variable is YEARS ij , that is the effective duration of the credit relationship, namely the number of years since the bank lender j granted the first loan to the borrower i 6 . According to other studies (e.g., Berger and Udell, 1995; Harhoff and Korting, 1998; Jiménez et al., 2006; Brick and Palia, 2007) , the duration of relationship banking significantly discourages the presence of loan collateralized because a longer relationship is a key to generate "soft" information about a borrower.
Lender's characteristics and credit market structure variables
Previous research (Inderst and Mueller, 2007; Jiménez et al., 2009) suggests that the use of collateral varies also across the characteristics of lenders and of credit market. Therefore in this subsection we explain variables used to measure these factors.
Lender distance Jiménez et al. (2009) observe that the distance between the lender and the borrower affects the use of collateral because it is a proxy of the informational advantage that some banks (local banks) have on the others (distant banks). Following this study we measure the variable DIST ij as the organizational distance (see among others Berger and DeYoung; 2001), i.e., the value of the distance (expressed in kilometres) between the province of the local bank branch that originates the loan and the city where the bank's headquarter is located 7 . However, unlike Jiménez et al. (2009) we predict that DIST positive acts on the probability of pledging collateral because the proximity between lender and borrower is expected to facilitate ex ante screening and ex post monitoring and as such, should reduce the informational gap.
Lender's experience indicator
Lenders that grant loans to unrated borrowers (i.e., borrowers with hidden information) should make this decision based on the knowledge of local market conditions accumulated through their experience. As a consequence in the model developed to stress the adverse selection problems we control the results by using a variable that measures the experience of the bank in the province
(SHARE). Following Jiménez et al. (2009) the variable SHARE ij is equal to the percentage of firms i
served by each bank j over the total number of firms active in the province of firm i at the end of the year. However, the expected sign of SHARE's coefficient by itself is ambiguous because the private information revealed through the experience could be favorable or unfavorable.
Market concentration indicator
Several studies find that an increase of bank competition should be associated to a reduction into collateral requirements. Thus and following various studies (among others Black and Strahan, 2002; Jiménez et al., 2009; Fiordelisi et al., 2011) , we measure the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) as the sum of banks squared market shares in loans granted in each one of the Italian provinces at the end of the year. 7 In more formal terms, the following proxy of distance was used: DIST ij = ln(1+KM ij ), where KM ij is the distance in kilometers between the province of firm i (in Italy, there are 110 provinces) and the headquarter of bank j (j=1..8).
Control variables
Various additional factors may influence the probability of pledging collateral. These factors can be at the bank and industry levels and related to the exposure of the bank against the firm. Therefore we put in the models dummy variables to control for industry (165 dummies) and lenders (8 dummies) of firms. Moreover we use CREDIT ij that is an aggregated measure of the credit outstanding; it sums loans, accounts receivable, short-term loans, long-term loans and revolving credit lines 8 . The greater the exposure of a bank against the firm i and the higher should be the probability of pledging collateral. Finally, since we have no information about the date of loan's collateralization (data are cross sectional at the end of 2008), we controlling for the age of collateral with the introduction of the binary variable NEW ij . This variable takes the value of one if loans of borrower i have been originated no longer than one year from the date of the analysis, and 0 otherwise. The basic idea is that with this variable we can identify a subsample of borrowers (those with NEW=1 and COLLATERAL=1) for which the collateral and loan's origination date are coincident.
Results
This section describes our findings. First, we present the results for firms with observed risk (i.e., rated firms) (sample A, Table 2 ). Second, we discuss our econometric model to investigate the link between collateral and its determinants for firms with hidden information (i.e., unrated firms) and firm-specific measures (i.e., CREDIT) controlling for the "age of collateral" (i.e., NEW, the date of collateral pledging).
Focusing on the observed risk ( Table 2 , Columns (1) and (2)), the positive regression coefficient estimate for RATING suggests that a higher probability of default (i.e., coming from 1, the less risky class, to 10, the worst class) increases the probability of collateral pledging supporting the moral hazard hypothesis (H1). Observed risk is associated with 0.71 percentage point increase in the probability of collateral, consistent with previous literature (Berger et al. 2011a , and Menkoff et al., 2006 , 2012 . Further, while we have no data on loan's interest rates, we find these result consistent with positive relationship between cost of loans and collateral as documented in John et al. (2003) . Results for new loans (i.e., loans originated no farther than one year) (RATING*NEW)
are also in this direction as they are found to be positively linked to the probability of collateral but the significance decreases (at the 10% confidence level). This is consistent with a limited availability of private information with new loans as lenders may have little qualitative data and information about borrower behavior (reliability and project choices).
We also report findings supporting the hypothesis H3 and the idea that micro-sized firms (e.g.
the most widespread firms in Italy) are more exposed to asymmetric information problem and to collateral pledging. Indeed, MICRO is associated with 14.62 percentage point increase in the probability of collateral supporting the previous studies (Berger et al., 2011b, and Ono and Uesugi, 2009 ). In contrast, LARGE and SMALL show a negative impact on the dependent variable.
We additionally show that our proxies for bank-firm relationship (i.e., LENDERS, and YEARS) have a substantial influence on the probability of collateral pledging as predicted by H4. Namely, estimated regression coefficient for LENDERS is positive confirming that a higher number of lenders increases the presence of loan collateralized (Jiménez et al., 2009, and Ono and Uesugi, 2009) . At the same time, estimated regression coefficient for YEARS is negative supporting the idea that private information accumulation over time decreases the probability of collateral (Elsas, 2005; Harhoff and Korting, 1998) . However, the interaction term between number of lenders and new loans (i.e., LENDERS*NEW) displays a negative and not statistically significant impact on probability of collateral pledging.
Additionally we find that the probability of collateral pledging is positively influenced by borrower-lender distance, and negatively related to degree of market concentration. As such, focusing on DIST, we report findings that are not consistent with the lender-based theories (i.e., Inderst and Mueller, 2007; Jiménez et al., 2009 ) supporting the idea that distant lenders, i.e., lenders for which it is more difficult to collect and transfer soft information from the branch to the headquarter, require more collateral. Thus, this result is consistent with the borrower-based theories and may be affected by changes in the Italian credit market over the last two decades: most banks have changed from a local decision-making model (i.e., local banks gather soft information and decide to grant a loan) to a distant decision-making model (i.e., local banks gather soft information and transfer it to headquarter) (e.g., Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Alessandrini et al., 2009 ).
However, the coefficient of the cross-effect between the distance and new loans (i.e., DIST*NEW)
is not statistically significant 9 . Moreover, focusing on HHI, we find that the probability of collateral pledging has a (negative) statically significant link with HHI. These findings on Italian credit market are in line with the study of Jiménez et al. (2006) that analyzes the Spanish credit market and support the theory according to which the use of collateral is more likely with competition than monopoly Thakor, 1987b, and more recently Inderst and Muller, 2007) . Results for new loans are also in this direction as the cross-effect between the market concentration and new loans (i.e., HHI*NEW) is statistically significant. Considering the marginal effects, we note that if a firm applies for a loan to a lender for the first time in a competitive market, the likelihood of pledging collateral increases by 8.4%.
Finally, controlling for the bank exposure against the borrower, the probability of collateral pledging increases with CREDIT according to the theory (i.e., Boot et al., 1991) and the evidence on determinants of collateral (i.e., Jimenez et al., 2006) that predicts an increase of collateral for loans of larger size in the bad states of the world (e.g., credit turmoil). However, the interaction between the credit outstanding and the new loans (i.e., CREDIT*NEW) holds the predicted sign but it is not significant.
Sample B -Unrated firms
Probit data regression of Eq. (2) First, high levels of unobserved risk (i.e., DEFAULT) are associated with lower probability of collateralized loans. That is to say, to the extent that this occurs, good borrowers are more likely to pledge collateral according to models of signaling (e.g., Berger et al., 2011a) . This finding supporting the adverse selection hypothesis (H2), i.e., the use of collateral is expected to be higher for high quality borrowers in presence of hidden information. However, the interaction between the state of default and new loans (i.e., DEFAULT*NEW) is positive but its sign is not statistical significant. This evidence may be affected by the low number (i.e., 160) of new firm defaulted after just two years from the start of relationship with the lender.
Second, we find that if a firm is classified as LARGE or MICRO, it is more likely to pledge collateral. More specifically, the smallest class of borrower size, captured by the dummy MICRO, affects positively the collateralization of the loan. As smallest firms suffering of a serious lack of transparency, this finding is consistent with H3. That is, if a lender grants a loan to micro-sized firm with hidden information problems the probability to pledge collateral increases of 14%.
Third, relationship banking measures are also likely to impact on the probability of collateral for unrated firms. As such, we find that LENDERS has a consistent direct impact on the probability of collateral pledging as predicted by H4. Results for Num*NEW are also in this direction providing evidence that the lack of exclusivity causes an increase of the likelihood of collateral mainly for new loans. At the same time, we find that YEARS shows a consistent direct impact on the collateral pledging. That is to say, also in the presence of hidden information problems, the length of relationship captured by its duration is significantly related to the incidence of collateral (Jiménez et al., 2009; Berger et al., 2011a) .
Fourth, the lender's characteristics and market structure measures show an impact on the probability of collateral for unrated firms. The coefficient estimate on DIST is positive and significant. At contrast, the degree of concentration proxied by HHI does not appear to be relevant to the incidence of collateral. However, consistent with findings on rated firms, the coefficient of the cross-effects between the measure of concentration and new loans is negative and significant (i.e., HHI*NEW). Moreover, Column (3) of Table 2 includes SHARE ij as additional explanatory variable. Since the relative number of firms served by the lenders in the province is an indirect measure of their knowledge of local market conditions, SHARE suggests that the knowledge of the province affects the probability of collateral pledging to unrated firms. This effect is confirmed when controlling for the interaction between this measure and new loans (i.e., SHARE*NEW) that shows a positive and significant coefficient.
Finally, the measure of the credit outstanding seems to represent an important predictor of collateral pledging only for new loans (i.e., CREDIT*NEW).
Additional evidences on the role of relationship lending
Our results show that bank-firm relationship affects the probability of collateral pledging to rated and unrated firms, and clearly depict a framework where a strength relationship between borrower and lender discourages the use of collateral. As such, the strength of the relationship is measured according to the most widespread measures suggested by literature (i.e., duration of bankfirm relationship and the number of banks the borrower has loans with). While this effect can be explained by the enhancement of monitoring ability of the lender in those case where the relationship with borrower is strength, we need to clarify which is, between YEARS and LENDERS, the relationship variable that most plays a disincentive role for collateral use.
There are reasons why this evidence should be further investigated when studying the determinants of collateral. First, when the borrower practices multiple lending relationship, a long relationship with one of the lender could discourage the latter to ask for collateral due to the development of close ties. Second, there may be some interdependencies (i.e., moderating effects) between the variables used to proxy the strength of relationship that may affect the likelihood of collateral being pledged. Third, it is also possible that the partial effect of market structure measures on the collateral depends on the magnitude of the bank-firm relationship.
Thus, this section presents additional evidences on the role of relationship lending when we identify the determinants of the probability of collateral pledging for rated firms (Sample A). First, we investigate the impact of moderating effects between the duration of the relationship and the number of banks on the likelihood of collateral being pledged (columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 ).
Second, we discuss the interdependencies between the market structure measures and the relationship measure and their effect on the probability of collateral pledging (columns 5, 6 7 and 8
of Table 3 ). Third, we analysis the moderating effect between the duration of relationship and the organizational distance (DIST).
To this scope we create three dummy variables for that take the value of 1 when the variables LENDERS, HHI and DIST assume values ≥ or ≤ their median. Then, we analyze the joint effect between these dummies and the duration of relationship (YEARS) with some interactions.
<Insert here TABLE 3>
We report some interesting additional evidences on the role of relationship lending. As such, we report that the probability of observing an increase in collateralized loans is associated with a decrease in the duration of relationship also when we moderate with the impact of the multiple lending and the degree of competition. We also show that the impact of HHI on the probability of collateral pledging is negative, also taking into account the moderating effect of the duration of relationship (i.e., YEARS*HHI(1/0)), i.e., lenders respond to greater competition by asking less collateral if there is a long relationship.
Finally, we include in columns 7, and 8 of Table 3 the interaction between the duration of the relationship and the distance, i.e., YEARS*Dist (1/0), where the latter is binary variable that assumes the value of 1 if Dist is ≥ 38 (the median value).
Once again, the use of collateral is more likely with competition than monopoly even if a long relationship mitigate this effect . The positive regression coefficient of DIST suggests that a higher distance increases the likelihood of the use of collateral according to borrower-based theory while the cross-effect between the duration of relationship and the distance (the marginal effect of YEARS*Dist(1/0) on the probability of pledging collateral is -0.0033, and highly statistical significant) seems to reverse this effect according to lender-based theory (e.g., Jiménez et al., 2009) .
That is to say, distance reduces the incentives to collect soft information and transfer it along the organization and enhances the probability to ask more collateral, but developing closer relationships with their firms helps local lenders to ask for collateral in order to still take advantage of any superior information.
Conclusions
Existing evidence on the determining factors of collateral pledging is mixed and does not adequately control for the moderating effects of the relationship banking on the other determining factors. This paper presents an exhaustive analysis of the determinants of collateral pledging in loans granted to firms by using the unique internal data of a large Italian banking group reporting 9,930 bank-firm relationships. Our empirical exercise builds on a unique and distinctive dataset that allows us to exactly measure the borrower risk observed by bank lender (i.e., internal ratings) and to distinguish between borrowers with observed risk measure and borrowers whose level of risk is not observable from bank lender (i.e., borrowers without internal rating).
We find that riskier borrowers are encouraged to give more collateral to banks in order to obtain a loan, while in presence of hidden information are the less risk borrowers to offer collateral in order to signal their quality. These results are consistent with the moral hazard and adverse selection hypotheses. However, not only collateral is able to solve the asymmetric information problems as we find the stronger the relationship banking the lower is the probability that banks asking for collateral. Specifically, we report that the duration of relationship is the most effective measure of relationship banking as a long relationship with one of the lender discourage the latter to ask for collateral when the borrower practices multiple lending relationship. Furthermore, unlike the lender-based theory, we observe distant banks are more likely to pledge collateral than local banks, although we find that the duration of relationship banking acts on the lender-borrower distance by reducing the probability that distant banks ask for collateral. Finally, we find that a possible drawback of high competitive credit markets is related to a more ask for collateral. Overall, our results confirms the borrowed-based theories: namely on one hand we suggest that collateral mainly serve to reduce the informational advantages of borrowers over lenders, especially in high competitive credit markets, the other we display that relationship lending is complementary to collateral.
Our empirical evidence addresses new questions related to explaining the impact of relationship measures on the use of collateral with respect to specialization of lenders (i.e., local cooperative banks versus distant commercial banks). 11 We consider that one firm experiences a default event if it has (at least) one or more past due loans remaining unpaid three months after the maturity date. In this case, the internal rating systems of the banks put in the 11 th class (the default class) the borrower. In this class borrowers are then classified according to the severity of the distress. 12 In cases where the credit relationship duration is less than one year, this duration is approximated as one year. 13 In more formal terms, the following proxy of distance was used: DIST ij = ln(1+KM ij ), where KM ij is the distance in kilometers between the province of firm i (in Italy, there are 110 provinces) and the headquarter of bank j (j=1..8). 14 A credit line is here indented here as a contract that allows a borrower to take advantage of a predetermined "line limit" and repay it at the borrower's discretion with an interest rate periodically set by the bank. Whenever the drawn credit exceeds the line limit, the bank charges a penalty interest rate.
Variables Symbol Description
Borrower's characteristics variables Borrower observed risk RISK This variable contains the borrower's creditworthiness as calculated by the banks' internal borrower rating system, which is composed of 10 risk classes for solvent borrowers (i.e., 1 = the less risky class; 10 = the worst) Table 1 for description of the other variables. Under the heading ''Probit coefficients,'' we report the estimated coefficients of the two probit specifications. Standard errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity, are reported between brackets. Under the heading ''Marginal effects,'' we report the change in probability of pledging collateral for each one of the independent variables. For continuous variables we report the effect for an infinitesimal change in each independent variable; dummy variables are treated as continuous variables. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the1%, 5%, and10% level, respectively. This table reports probit regressions for COLLATERAL, a dummy variable that equals one if borrowing firm has a collateralized loan. We test interaction effect of duration or bank-firm relationship (YEARS) with other independent variable. Specifically, YEARSxLENDERS(1/0) is the product between YEARS and a dummy that takes the value of one if the number of banks of a firm is equal or major than 3 (the median value of LENDERS). YEARSxHHI(1/0) is the product between YEARS and a dummy that takes the value of one if HHI is equal or minor than 652 (the median value of HHI). YEARSxDIST(1/0) is the interaction with a dummy that takes the value of one if DIST is equal or major than 38 (the median value of DIST). See Table 1 for description of the other variables. Under the heading ''Probit coefficients,'' we report the estimated coefficients of the three probit specifications. Standard errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity, are reported between brackets. Under the heading ''Marginal effects,'' we report the change in probability of pledging collateral for each one of the independent variables. For continuous variables we report the effect for an infinitesimal change in each independent variable; dummy variables are treated as continuous variables. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the1%, 5%, and10% level, respectively.
